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Abstract
In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of
15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the
European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances
spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the
European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place.
A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in
institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of
the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance
setting.
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Introduction
In the European Union (EU), supranational and subnational institutions comple-
ment the governance structure of national political systems (Hooghe and Marks,
2003; Marks and Hooghe, 2000). In this multilevel governance system, changes in
public trust in institutions at one level of governance influence public trust in
institutions at other levels. Therefore, many scholars have investigated how
changes in citizens’ attitudes towards institutions placed at one level spill onto
institutions at other levels (Anderson, 1998; Kritzinger, 2003; Sa´nchez-Cuenca,
2000; Torcal and Christmann, 2018).
In this article, we contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we propose a
taxonomy of the possible kinds of interactions among institutions. We say that two
institutions are interacting when there are trust spillovers among them. We say that
the kind of interaction between two institutions is defined in terms of the direction
(i.e. unilateral or bilateral) and the sign (i.e. positive or negative) of the spillovers
between these institutions. This taxonomy reveals eight different types of possible
interactions. In contrast, the existing literature has focused almost exclusively on
only two of these interactions, in particular those described by congruence theory
(Anderson, 1998; Torcal and Christmann, 2018) and compensation theory
(Kritzinger, 2003; Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2000). In our taxonomy, we label these two
theories ‘unilateral congruence’ and ‘unilateral compensation’, respectively.
After having developed our taxonomy, we employ a model of differential
equations that allows us to determine which of the eight kinds of interactions
emerge among the national parliaments (NPs) of 15 Member States1 and three
key European institutions: the European Commission (EC), the European
Parliament (EP) and the European Central Bank (ECB). This analysis shows
that in all countries there is a clear predominance of asymmetric interactions, a
kind of interaction that has been overlooked by the literature.
Asymmetric interactions present two features. First, the spillovers are bidirec-
tional. That is, changes in trust level in NPs affect trust in EU institutions and
changes in trust level in EU institutions affect trust in NPs. Second, an increase/
decrease in the trust in the national institution influences trust levels in EU insti-
tutions in one direction (e.g. positive), whereas an increase/decrease in the trust in
EU institutions influences trust in the NP in the opposite direction (e.g. negative).
For instance, our results show the existence of an asymmetric interaction between
the Danish NP and the EP after the year 2012. In this case, an increase in the trust
in the NP would generate a positive spillover onto the EP. Vice versa, an increase in
the trust in the EP would generate a negative spillover onto the NP. This result
entails that the two dominant theories of trust spillovers between national and EU
institutions, i.e. congruence theory and compensation theory, are an oversimplifi-
cation of reality.
In line with recent literature (Torcal and Christmann, 2018), our analysis con-
firms that the way in which institutions interact changes over time. These results
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highlight the need to employ dynamic models to study trust spillovers between
institutions at different levels of governance within the EU.
The analysis is performed at the country level. Therefore, we write a separate
code for each of the 15 countries. For this reason, the fact that we observe similar
patterns across all the countries considered is remarkable, and suggests that there
might be some fundamental rules determining how national and EU institutions
interact. Uncovering these rules would be an important step to improve our under-
standing of the multi-institutional European architecture.
Literature review
At the most general level, the literature on political trust spillovers can be divided
in two strands. One strand focuses on spillover effects from national institutions to
the EU as a whole (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Harteveld et al., 2013;
Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011). The other strand focuses on interactions between
specific institutions at the two levels of governance (Ares et al., 2017; Arnold
et al., 2012; Munoz et al., 2011). Our study is connected with the second strand
of research. In particular, building on Norris (2017), we look at spillovers in insti-
tutional trust as a component of political support.2 In doing so, we are interested in
identifying the existing kinds of interactions among four key institutions: the NPs
of 15 Member States, the EU, the EP, and the ECB.
For the purpose of this article, there is an interaction between two institutions
when there are trust spillovers between them. When there are no spillovers in terms
of trust between two institutions, we say that the institutions are not interacting.
The kind of interaction among institutions is defined in terms of the sign (positive
or negative) and the direction (unilateral or bilateral) of these spillovers. Building
on the language of congruence and compensation theory, Figure 1 provides a
taxonomy of the possible interactions occurring between institutions.
Earlier studies on political trust interactions investigated spillovers from the
national level to the European level, and therefore refer only to the quadrants
‘unilateral compensation’ and ‘unilateral congruence’. A first group of scholars
advanced the so-called congruence theory (Anderson, 1998; Hobolt and
Wittrock, 2011; Rohrschneider, 2002; Torcal and Christmann, 2018). According
to this theory, citizens assess the performance of EU institutions based on the
perceived performance of national institutions. Two mechanisms explain this
phenomenon. First, citizens have limited direct information on EU institutions,
and therefore they take cues from national institutions to assess the quality of
EU institutions (Anderson, 1998). This research builds on cue theory
(Sniderman et al., 1993), which posits that individuals use heuristics to form opin-
ions when lacking information (Zaller, 1992). Second, national institutions partic-
ipate into the EU ones and thus can shape their functioning (Anderson, 1998). An
example of this is the Council of the EU, where its (different) configurations—
made up of the government ministries of each EU member state—play an impor-
tant role for the EU policy-making process. In this vein, this literature posits that
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an increase in the levels of trust in, and support for, national institutions generates
a positive spillover in terms of trust in, and support for, European institutions.
In our framework, this theory is defined as ‘unilateral congruence.’ Changes in
the trust in national institutions generate a spillover of the same sign toward
European institutions (congruence). At the same time, the spillovers only go
from the national to the European level (unilateral).
Other scholars, instead, formulated the compensation theory (Kritzinger, 2003;
Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2000). According to this theory, citizens use national institutions
as a benchmark against which they compare the performance of EU institutions.
On the one hand, if citizens perceive national institutions as performing negatively,
transferring sovereignty from the national level to the EU presents a lower risk
(Sa´nchez-Cuenca, 2000). On the other hand, a positive evaluation of the EU can be
seen as a reaction for discontent against domestic institutions (Kritzinger, 2003).
Therefore, according to compensation theory, a change in the trust in the national
Figure 1. Taxonomy of the possible forms of interactions among institutions.
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level produces a spillover of the opposite sign toward the EU institution (compen-
sation). Since spillovers only go from the national to the European level, this
interaction is unilateral. Thus, we include this theory in the quadrant ‘unilateral
compensation’.
Recent research challenges the idea that spillovers only go from the national
level to the European level. For instance, Mair (2013) argues that the EP often fails
to create enthusiasm and commitment in the electorate, producing a negative effect
also on trust for national institutions. Similarly, Chiru and Gherina (2012) show
that there can be positive spillovers from the European to the national level when
the EU is associated with the idea of democratization and marketization.
Therefore, these works argue that changes in the trust in EU institutions produce
spillovers of the same sign onto national institutions (congruence). However, while
these works debunk the idea that spillovers run only from the national to the
European level, they do not discuss the specific types of bilateral spillovers that
can emerge between institutions located at different governance levels. Similarly to
the studies that focused on ‘unilateral compensation’ and ‘unilateral congruence’,
they only look at spillovers from one level to another.3
On the contrary, our taxonomy shows that once the possibility of spillovers
from EU institution to national institution is acknowledged, different kinds of
bidirectional interactions between the two levels of governance can emerge. In
particular, bilateral interactions can be either symmetric (‘bilateral congruence’
and ‘bilateral compensation’) or asymmetric (of type I and type II).
An interaction is symmetric when changes in the trust in the national institution
produce a spillover of the same sign as the spillover produced by changes in the
trust in the EU institution towards the national institution. For instance, according
to our results, between 2008 and 2012 the Belgian national parliament and the EP
enter in a relationship of bilateral compensation. Here, an increase in the trust in
the Belgian NP would produce a negative spillover onto the EP and an increase in
the trust in the EP would produce a negative spillover onto the NP.
Another form of bilateral symmetric interaction is bilateral congruence. For
instance, between 2003 and 2006 the Belgian national parliament and the EP
engaged in this form of relationship. In this vein, an increase in the trust in the
NP would increase the trust in the EP and an increase in the trust in the EP would
increase the trust in the NP. Therefore, the two forms of interactions are symmetric
because the effect of a change in the trust in national institutions on EU institu-
tions is the same—in terms of sign—as that of a change in the trust in EU insti-
tutions on national institutions.
On the contrary, there is an asymmetric interaction when a change in the trust in
the national institution influences the trust in the EU in one direction (e.g. posi-
tive), whereas a change in the trust in the EU influences the trust in the national
institution in the other direction (e.g. negative).
We distinguish two types of asymmetric interactions, type I and type II. In a
type I asymmetric interaction, growing trust in a national institution increases the
trust in the European institution, whereas an increase in the trust in the European
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institution decreases the trust in the national institution. In a type II asymmetric
interaction, an increase in the trust in a national institution decreases the trust in
the European institution, whereas an increase in the trust in the European insti-
tution increases the trust in the national institution. Thus, when the interaction is
asymmetric changes in the trust in the European institution and in the national
institution have an opposite impact on the institution at the other level of
governance.
Notice that identifying the type of asymmetric interaction (i.e. type I or type II)
that occurs at a given moment can be valuable for European and national insti-
tutions. For example, the EC would benefit from an increase in trust in the nation-
al institution only in a type I asymmetric interaction.
Data and methods
Method
This article differs substantially from the majority of empirical research on trust
and political support, insofar it does not use statistical methods to analyze trust.
Rather, we adopt a deterministic model based on differential equations. A brief
formal description of the model can be found in the Online appendix, whereas the
full description and the mathematical proofs underlying the model can be found in
Marasco et al. (2016). The model was originally developed to study the interactions
among firms (Marasco et al., 2016), and was later applied to investigate the most
disparate contexts like inter-generational conflict (Marasco and Romano, 2018),
the interaction among renewable energy sources and oil prices (Dominioni et al.,
2019) and the dynamics of racial groups in the US society (Dominioni et al., 2018).
The main purpose of this model is the study of how entities interact to allocate a
scarce resource in an established niche. In this particular case, the model studies
how institutions interact in terms of trust. The term interaction has to be read
according to the definition given in this study, namely that two institutions are
interacting when there are trust spillovers between them. This broad definition
explains the flexibility of the model, and why it can be applied in such a wide
range of contexts. It is clear that a change in the strategy of a firm has an effect (a
spillover) on the competitive position of the other firms in the same market.
Similarly, as extensively shown by the literature (Anderson, 1998; Armingeon
and Guthmann, 2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2002), a change in
the trust for an institution influences the trust for other institutions. Therefore,
this model allows us to identify the kind of trust interaction (i.e. the sign and the
direction of trust spillovers) among institutions.
In this framework, the sign of the spillovers is represented by the so-called
interaction coefficients. The interaction coefficient captures how a change in the
inner strength (in this context, trust) of an entity (institution) affects the inner
strength of another entity. The sign of the interaction coefficient then determines
the sign of the spillovers (see Table 1).
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This model has a number of properties that make it an ideal complement to
statistical studies, especially for the study of trust spillovers in a complex, dynamic,
and multilayered institutional landscape. First, it allows us to capture any possible
kind of interaction (Table 1), i.e. any possible combination of spillovers. Second,
the interaction coefficients of the model are dependent on time, and therefore we
can identify how the interaction evolves over time. This is an important property
since trust spillovers depend on the context (Torcal and Christmann, 2018), and
hence might change over time. Third, this model allows us to describe the simul-
taneous interactions among an arbitrarily great number of entities. In other words,
we do not have to isolate a dyad of institutions to identify whether their trust
correlates positively or negatively. Instead, we can study a framework in which n
institutions interact simultaneously, influencing each other. This is especially rel-
evant in the EU multilevel governance where a high number of national and supra-
national institutions are constantly interacting (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Marks
and Hooghe, 2000). Fourth, since the solutions of the model are known, we do not
have to rely on expensive numerical methods as genetic algorithms to estimate the
model parameters but we can derive the kind of interaction among institutions
from very limited data. Thanks to this property, we can study aggregate dynamics
at a country level.
To be sure, it is possible to devise statistical studies that present some of the
features of our model. For example, it is certainly possible to perform a statistical
analysis that identifies how the sign of the spillovers between two institutions
changes over time. However, it would be complicated to perform a statistical
analysis that simultaneously presents the four features described above.
Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, in the existing literature, there is no statistical
study that presents all these features.
Table 1. Correspondence table between possible interactions and the interactions in congru-
ence and compensation theories (and neutralism).
Congruence and compensation framework
Kind of interaction
in Lotka Volterra
literature
Sign of the
interaction
coefficients
Bilateral compensation Competition þ and þ
Asymmetric interaction type I Predator–Prey þ and –
Asymmetric interaction type II
Bilateral congruence Mutualism – and –
Unilateral congruence Commensalism – and 0
Reversed unilateral congruence
Unilateral compensation Amensalism þ and 0
Reversed unilateral compensation
Neutralism Neutralism 0 and 0
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Data
We use data from 31 Eurobarometer (EB) surveys4 pertaining to the years 2000–
2015 for the 15 countries that were members of the European Community in 2000.5
We perform the analysis at the country level, and hence we take national averages
for each survey. Our data point is the percentage of individuals in a Member State
that declared to tend to trust an institution. Thus, we have 31 observations for each
institution per Member State.
This dataset is rather small when compared to the dataset used in most statis-
tical analyses performed on the same topic. However, there are two factors justi-
fying our choice. First, the goal of this study is not to make causal inferences, but
to identify the nature of interactions. In mathematical terms this translates into
fitting observational data with a function. Second, the analytic solution of the
model presented is known, and therefore we do not have to estimate the param-
eters of the model (see Marasco et al., 2016 for a formal proof). Instead, we can
directly identify the function that provides the best fit to the data (Marasco et al.,
2016). In short, the kind of question asked and the kind of mathematical model
adopted justify the use of a relatively small dataset.6
Previous research conceptualized trust at the individual level, whereas we study
aggregate levels of trust. By using aggregate data we can obtain comparable data
for many countries covering a significant time horizon. This allows us to exploit
the features of our model to uncover macro-trends.
For each country we collect data on trust relative to the EC, the EP, the ECB,
and the NPs. For the three European institutions, the data refer to the question
‘And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?’,
which is answered in a multiple choice format (Tend to trust; Tend not to trust;
Don’t know). Trust in the NP is measured on the basis of the following question: ‘I
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to
trust it or tend not to trust it?’. Also in this case, the answer is provided on a trinary
basis (Tend to trust; Tend not to trust; Don’t know). For each institution, we
operationalize trust levels with the percentage of respondents that responded
‘Tend to trust’.
The choice of institutions is based on the following criteria. We select NP and
EP because they are the most comparable institutions in terms of how their mem-
bers are appointed and how well citizens are informed about them (similarly,
Munoz et al., 2011). Including the EC and the ECB allows us to study the inter-
actions between elected institutions (NP vs. EP) and between elected and non-
elected institutions (NP vs. EC/ECB). We include the EC and the ECB because
these are the most publicly known non-elected institutions in the EU according to
the Eurobarometer. For instance, in 2013, 83% and 85% of respondents had heard
of the EC and the ECB, respectively. Other institutions are much less known by the
public. For example, in 2013, only 69% and 77% of respondents had heard of the
Council of the EU and the European Court of Justice. Citizens are more likely to
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form independent attitudes towards known institutions than towards unknown
institutions. Indeed, there is evidence that citizens’ trust towards the ECB varies
depending on the perceived performance of the ECB itself (Ehrmann et al., 2013).
Data availability also influenced our choice of institutions, since the
Eurobarometer provides (almost) complete data for all the countries considered
only for a limited set of institutions.
All the data are presented in the form of trust shares. These shares are computed
by dividing the trust in each institution by the sum of the trust in all the institutions
in the given year/country. For instance, assume that the proportion of Austrians
that tend to trust the institutions are respectively: NP¼ 30%; EP¼ 20%;
EC¼ 50%; ECB¼ 50%. In this case, the trust share of the Austrian NP is given
by 30=ð30þ 20þ 50þ 50Þ ¼ 0:2. Mathematically, this is a necessary choice
because the logit model—and hence the model adopted here—requires that data
are expressed in terms of shares. Conceptually, the use of trust shares is consistent
with our research question, given that we are interested in studying how a change
in the level of trust in one institution influences the trust in other institutions, and
not in the absolute values of trust. The Online appendix presents the summary
statistics of the data collected.
Results and discussion
General observations
To begin with, we note that our model offers an accurate description of the trust
dynamic among the institutions considered. We assess the accuracy considering
two standard measures of error: the mean square error (MSE) and the mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE). Following Lewis (1982), we consider our
model to be highly accurate if MAPE < 10%, good for 10% < MAPE < 20%,
reasonable for 20% < MAPE < 50%, and inaccurate if MAPE > 50%. In 58
instances out of 60, the model proves to be ‘highly accurate’. In the remaining
two cases its accuracy is ‘good’. On average, the MAPE is way below the 10%
threshold and hence we can consider the model as generally ‘highly accurate’ (see
the Online appendix).
Our results emphasize three general patterns. First, the trust spillovers are
always bidirectional. Not only the trust in national institutions influences
the trust in European institutions, but also the latter affects the former.
Indeed, we never observe unilateral compensation and unilateral congruence.
Previous research has consistently shown that citizens tend to rely on national
politics as a basis to trust the EU institutions (Sanders et al., 2012). Given a general
lack of knowledge about the EU, national economic and instrumental causes serve
as cues for forming a certain attitude towards the EU. This mechanism therefore
accounts for the existence of trust spillovers from the national to the EU level.
On the contrary, the existence of spillovers from the EU to the national level is
less established. Some scholars argued that changes in the trust in EU institutions
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can create positive and negative spillovers towards national institutions (Chiru and
Gherghina, 2012; Mair, 2013). Other authors argued that a negative assessment of
the political process in the EU itself can reduce support and trust in EU institu-
tions (Dotti Sani and Magistro, 2016; Hobolt, 2011; Roth et al., 2013). If this is
true, it stands to reason that the political process in the EU can also affect trust in
national institutions.
One hypothesis is that the sign of the spillover might depend on the attitude of
national institutions towards the EU. In countries that have parliaments and
governments that are more pro-EU (e.g. Germany), a decrease in the trust in
European institutions might produce a negative spillover on the pro-EU institu-
tions. Vice versa, in countries in which the governing parties are more anti-EU (e.g.
the first Italian government after the 2018 political elections), such trend might
produce a positive spillover on the anti-EU institutions. To be clear, the orienta-
tion of national institutions toward the EU is unlikely to be the only determinant
of the sign of the spillovers, but it is plausibly a factor.
Second, we observe that institutions change the way in which they interact over
time. This is evidence that spillovers are context dependent, and that dynamic
models are important to study how inter-institutional interactions evolve over
time (Ares et al., 2017; Torcal and Christmann, 2018).
Third, our analysis indicates that the ECB interacts with the NPs in a very
different way than with the EC and the EP. While interactions between NPs and
the EC/EP fall almost always under the two types of asymmetric interactions, this
pattern is not observed for ECB-NPs interactions (see the Online appendix). ECB-
NPs interactions present a less regular pattern than those between NPs and the
EC/EP, suggesting that the ECB is perceived as markedly distinct from the other
EU institutions considered. The distinction between the ECB and the other insti-
tutions considered is in line with previous findings in the literature showing that
citizens can form independent attitudes towards the ECB (Ehrmann et al., 2013).
Asymmetric interactions and underlying theory
The main finding of our article is that there is a clear prevalence of asymmetric
interactions in all the 15 countries considered. Moreover, in 10 countries we
observe only asymmetric interactions. Interestingly, we note that even the financial
crisis did not break the dominance of asymmetric interactions. The likelihood of
finding a prevalence of asymmetric interactions in all countries for a given pair of
institutions is about 0.00003 (see the Online appendix for a full discussion of this
finding), and hence this result cannot be considered random. More specifically, if
we focus on the interactions NPs-EC and NPs-EP we observe that roughly 440
years are characterized by one of the two types of asymmetric interaction over a
total of 465 years (two pairs of institutions interacting for 15.5 years in 15 coun-
tries).7 In other words, NPs are in an asymmetric interaction with the EC and the
EP about 95% of the time. Thus, our study reveals that asymmetric spillovers are a
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fundamental feature of political trust dynamics in the multilevel governance struc-
ture of the EU. Figures 2 and 3 present the detailed results.
Figures 2 and 3 are best read in conjunction with Table 1, which describes how
the sign of the interaction coefficients determines the kind of interaction between
the institutions considered. If both interaction coefficients are positive, there is a
bilateral compensation between the institutions. If both coefficients are negative,
there is a bilateral congruence. Both these forms of interactions are symmetric, and
in fact the two interaction coefficients have the same sign. On the contrary, when
Figure 2. Interaction coefficients of EC (dotted line) and NP (solid line) in the 15 countries
considered. The interaction coefficients are on the vertical axis, while time is on the horizontal
axis. The relevant information is the sign of the interaction coefficients and not their absolute
value because the interaction coefficients are not expressed in a unit of measure that allows us to
easily identify the exact magnitude of the spillover.
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one of the interaction coefficients is positive and one is negative we observe an
asymmetric interaction.
An obvious question then is how these asymmetric interactions develop. To
understand these dynamics, we look more closely at the case of Spain, and draw
parallels to the results obtained by Torcal and Christmann (2018). They observe
that starting in 2009 there was a sharp decline in the trust that Spanish citizens
placed in their national institutions, and that this decline also reduced the trust in
European institutions. Moreover, they find that the intensity of this negative
Figure 3. Interaction coefficients of EP (dotted line) and NP (solid line) in the 15 countries
considered. The interaction coefficients are on the vertical axis, while time is on the horizontal
axis. The relevant information is the sign of the interaction coefficients and not their absolute
value because the interaction coefficients are not expressed in a unit of measure that allows us to
easily identify the exact magnitude of the spillover.
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spillover intensified during periods of economic distress. To explain their findings,
they rely on the traditional arguments put forward by congruence theory, namely
that national politics serves as a basis for the perceived performance of EU
institutions.
Our findings are consistent with the evidence produced by Torcal and
Christmann (2018). In particular, we observe that between 2009 and 2014 the
EC and the NP are in an asymmetric interaction of type I, in which a decrease
in the trust in the NP has a negative impact on the trust in the EC. This interaction
is described by Figure 2. In fact, between 2009 and 2014 the NP has a negative
interaction coefficient, whereas the EC has a positive interaction coefficient. We
observe also that the intensity of this interaction increased around 2008–2009 when
the Spanish gross domestic product per capita started to decline due to the finan-
cial crisis. This form of interaction persists until 2013–2014 when the Spanish
unemployment rate started to decline. The fact that two studies using two different
methodologies produce compatible results increases the reliability of both. Thus, in
line with Torcal and Christmann (2018), we suggest that citizens use cues from the
national system to evaluate European institutions.
Moreover, Torcal and Christmann (2018) note that citizens’ positive evaluation
of the EU performance partially counterbalanced the negative spillover from the
national level. In other words, at least some Spanish citizens were able to form an
independent opinion of the quality of the EU governance, instead of relying only
on national cues. If citizens are sufficiently informed to have an opinion about the
quality of EU institutions, they are in the position to benchmark them against
national institutions. In this vein, the increase in trust among EU institutions that
Torcal and Christmann (2018) observe would generate a negative spillover onto
national institutions, in line with compensation theory.
The results of our model support this theoretical possibility, and hence point to
an asymmetric interaction of type I. The decrease in trust in national institutions
generates a spillover of the same sign on EU institutions (congruence). At the same
time, growing trust in EU institutions generates a decrease in the trust in national
institutions (compensation). Our results indicate that this particular dynamic of
trust spillovers does not only occur in Spain, as asymmetric spillovers are the norm
in all the countries considered.
Another result of our model is that the kind of asymmetric interaction changes
over time. Therefore, at times the dynamic described above is reversed, and there is
a compensation mechanism operating from the national level to the European level
and a congruence mechanism operating from the European level to the national
level (type II asymmetric interaction). The possibility of a compensation mecha-
nism from the national level to the European level is supported by the findings of
Munoz et al. (2011) and Sa´nchez-Cuenca (2000) who observe how a change in the
trust for national institutions can create a spillover of the opposite sign onto
European institutions. For instance, the emergence of salient issues like corruption
may lead citizens to use this specific set of information as a basis for benchmarking
the performance of national and EU institutions. At the same time, the possibility
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of a congruence mechanism from the European level is supported by the studies of
Chiru and Gherghina (2012) and Mair (2013) who argue that the positive spillover
from the EU to the national level is due to the fact that EU membership is asso-
ciated with political and economic benefits.
One hypothesis is that the kind of asymmetric interaction (type I or type II) is
determined by the issues that are salient at different points in time. Salient issues
are those about which citizens are relatively well informed since they are exten-
sively covered by the media (Torcal and Christmann, 2018; Wilson and Hobolt,
2015). This suggests that when there are salient issues pertaining to the European
level, citizens might rely less on cues from the national level to evaluate EU
institutions. On the contrary, when most salient issues pertain to the national
level, citizens might rely more on cues on the national level to asses EU institu-
tions. Whether salient issues are associated with the national or the European level
may determine the type of asymmetric interaction.
Another important point that is worth discussing is the magnitude of the spill-
overs. While our model is well-suited to measure the relative size of the spillovers in
time, it should not be used to calculate the absolute magnitude of the effects.
Therefore, while we can answer the question ‘Were trust spillovers more intense
during the financial crisis?’, we do not attempt to answer the question ‘How much
of the variance in the trust for EU institutions depends on the spillovers from the
national level?’. This is another reason why our model is an important contribution
but needs to be complemented by statistical studies. First, a statistical study can
identify the exact magnitude of trust spillover at a given moment—something for
which our model is ill-equipped. Second, our model allows us to immediately
extrapolate how this magnitude changes at any point in time—a result that is
harder to obtain with statistical studies without large panel data.
Conclusions
Citizens’ trust in national and European institutions has been the object of sub-
stantial scholarly attention in recent decades. Within this literature, a number of
studies have analyzed spillovers in trust between the two levels of governance and
focused on identifying their determinants, intensity, direction, and sign.
This article contributes to this strand of research in two ways. First, we develop
a taxonomy of different kinds of possible interactions between institutions. We
identify eight kinds of interactions and show that existing research has focused
almost exclusively on only two of them. Second, we carry out an empirical analysis
to determine which of these interactions emerge between the EC, the EP, the ECB,
and the NPs of 15 European countries between the years 2000 and 2015.
We find that the interactions among these institutions are always bilateral, i.e.
changes in trust at the national level influence trust in EU institutions and vice
versa. This result indicates that spillovers among national and European institu-
tions are different from those described by congruence theory and compensation
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theory, as they both postulate that only spillovers from the national to the
European level exist.
We also find that spillovers between NPs and EC/EP are asymmetric for about
95% of the observed years. In other words, the sign of the spillover from the
national to the EU level is almost always the opposite of the sign of the spillovers
from the EU to the national level. This result can be explained using the theoretical
framework developed by other scholars (e.g. Torcal and Christmann, 2018),
according to which compensation and congruence can operate simultaneously.
Our findings also show that the sign of the spillovers changes over time. We
argue that changes in the sign of the spillover depend on which policy issues are
salient in citizens’ minds and on whether these issues are associated with the
national or the European level.
The asymmetric nature of the spillovers indicates that it can be difficult to
simultaneously increase the trust in national and EU institutions, as the increase
in trust in one institution can trigger a negative spillover towards other institutions.
The material relevance of this issue depends on the intensity of the spillovers. In
this respect, we find that the intensity of the spillovers varies across countries and
time. The causes of these variations remain unclear and need to be identified by
future research. More generally, research that adopts statistical approaches should
try to isolate the determinants of the various kinds of interactions and the factors
that yield changes in how institutions interact.
Another question that should be addressed by future research is why some
countries present similar dynamics. For instance, the interactions between the
Italian and Spanish NPs and the EP follow similar patterns up to 2012. Future
research could analyze whether the emergence of these similar patterns across
countries results from a common set of causes. This analysis exceeds the scope
of the present work, because it would be best performed with statistical methods
apt to identify causal relations at a more granular level.
In this article, the empirical analysis is performed using a model that has been
applied in many different contexts (e.g. Dominioni et al., 2019; Marasco and
Romano, 2018; Romano, 2016), but never in political science. We want to stress
that this model is very versatile, and could be used to answer a diverse range of
questions related to political trust. For instance, the model can be used to study the
interaction among political parties in a multiparty system. Consider for instance
the Italian case in which traditional parties like the Democratic Party face populist
parties like the Five Stars Movement and the League – Salvini Premier. In such a
framework, it becomes important to understand the spillovers in terms of consent
between traditional parties and populist parties, but also among traditional parties
and among populist parties.
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Notes
1. We consider the 15 countries that were already members of the European Community
in 2000.
2. Norris (2017) regards political support as a continuum encompassing different levels of
support. The most specific levels of political support, i.e. confidence in regime institutions
and approval of incumbent office-holders, coincide with political trust.
3. Since these works are silent on the spillovers from the national to the European level, it is
impossible to place them in one of the quadrants. These works can be included in the
following quadrants: ‘bilateral congruence’, ‘asymmetric interactions’, and ‘reversed uni-
lateral congruence’.
4. Data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Ch
art/index (accessed 16 September 2016).
5. The surveys are the following: EB52; EB53; EB54; EB55; EB56; EB57; EB58; EB59;
EB60; EB61; EB62; EB63; EB64; EB65; EB66; EB67; EB68; EB69; EB70; EB71;
EB72; EB73; EB74; EB75; EB76; EB77; EB78; EB79; EB80; EB81; EB82.
6. The existing literature on national-EU spillovers relies on trust data gathered from two
different sources, the Eurobarometer (e.g. Armingeon and Ceka, 2014) and the European
Social Survey (e.g. Munoz et al., 2011). We opted for the former because Eurobarometer
data are collected more frequently and therefore provides more historical data points for
each country. While our model is significantly less data demanding than statistical studies
generally employed in the literature on political trust, it still requires a minimum number
of observations that is higher than the number of observations available in the European
Social Survey data.
7. This is a conservative estimate that derives from subtracting 25 years in which a non-
asymmetric interaction emerges from the total of 465 years observed. In fact, the inter-
action coefficients cannot be expected to cross exactly at the axis in each single case.
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